New Terms of Clearance: OMB is approving this revised non-substantive request as submitted. The agency will timely work to submit a further revised version of this request with additional discussion of the management information and justification associated with this information collection. Consistent with OMB's 8/1/2025 passback to the agency, inclusive in this requested revision include: (1) management information regarding the attempted and successful use of SAP to-date; (2) management information regarding the volume of phone- and mySSA service requests for the four newly incorporated services; and (3) qualitative discussion of the fraud risks associated with the newly added services.
Previous Terms of Clearance still apply: If the agency chooses to continue this information collection after the emergency clearance period, it should ensure it is responding to public comments received during both the emergency clearance and normal 60- 30-day notice periods.
Inventory as of this Action
Requested
Previously Approved
09/30/2025
09/30/2025
09/30/2025
7,442,778
0
5,811,000
2,808,175
0
2,001,567
0
0
0
To mitigate fraud concerns, in April 2025, SSA will increase the level of identity proofing needed for customers to make payment method changes during phone interactions. While necessary to protect the public and the integrity of SSAâs programs, this limits the accessibility of the phone as a service channel for direct deposit requests (including post entitlement/post-eligibility direct deposit changes). To bridge this gap, SSA developed a hybrid identity proofing process called the Security Authentication PIN (SAP) that will provide identity proofing parity with our online modality, as well as in-person verification. Utilizing the SAP process will provide the necessary identity verification to allow payment method changes to direct deposit records via phone or in person, while ensuring fraud protection through verification of the identity of the individual prior to accessing or revising their account. SSA is implementing the new hybrid Security Authentication PIN (SAP) to digitally verify the identity of a telephone or in person customer when requesting changes to their direct deposit information. This supports the agencyâs changes to its identity proofing policy for post-entitlement/ post-eligibility actions for direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations. To ease the burden on customers, SSA created a vanity URL that will navigate customers directly to the Security Settings page within their online mySocial Security account, allowing them to quickly and easily generate the SAP after accessing their account. This feature will reduce the burden on the customer to navigate within their online account to the Security Settings pages where they may generate the SAP. The code generates immediately once the customer selects the âGenerate PINâ button. To allow for continued security for respondentâs personal information, and to ensure SSA is able to accurately verify the callersâ identities prior to accessing any SSA number holdersâ sensitive information, we are implementing this hybrid SAP process for telephone access to the direct deposit services. In this way, we continue to offer maximum flexibility and options to the public while ensuring the security of the publicâs social security number and benefits payments. We expect this new identity proofing will be a powerful fraud prevention tool. The respondents are individuals who wish to do business with SSA over the telephone or in person for the purposes of direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations.
We are submitting a Non-Substantive Change Request to increase the scope of the SAP to more telephone services, and update the documentation to show that the SAP process is voluntary.
To allow for continued security for respondentâs personal information, and to ensure SSA is able to accurately verify the callersâ identities prior to accessing any SSA number holdersâ sensitive information, we are implementing this hybrid SAP process for telephone access to the direct deposit services. In this way, we continue to offer maximum flexibility and options to the public while ensuring the security of the publicâs social security number and benefits payments. We expect this new identity proofing will be a powerful fraud prevention tool. The respondents are individuals who wish to do business with SSA over the telephone or in person for the purposes of post-entitlement/post-eligibility actions for direct deposit enrollments, updates or cancellations, or to discuss flagged initial claims for all Title II non-disability benefits (Retirement, Survivors, Auxiliary Spouses, Lump Sum Death Payments (LSDP), and Children benefits applications).
SSA is submitting this Change Request to increase the scope of use for this new Internet-based tool that increases the public reporting burden. See the chart above for updated burden figures.
* Note: The total burden reflected in ROCIS is 2,808,175 while the burden cited in the Change Request document is 990,072. This discrepancy is because the ROCIS burden reflects the average teleservice center and field office waiting times as well as the burden per response. In contrast, the chart in the attached Justification for the Non-Substantive Changes document reflects actual burden.
On behalf of this Federal agency, I certify that the collection of information encompassed by this request complies with 5 CFR 1320.9 and the related provisions of 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3).
The following is a summary of the topics, regarding the proposed collection of information, that the certification covers:
(i) Why the information is being collected;
(ii) Use of information;
(iii) Burden estimate;
(iv) Nature of response (voluntary, required for a benefit, or mandatory);
(v) Nature and extent of confidentiality; and
(vi) Need to display currently valid OMB control number;
If you are unable to certify compliance with any of these provisions, identify the item by leaving the box unchecked and explain the reason in the Supporting Statement.